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the Florida Court will limit the application of this doctrine to wills
in which such language is used remains to be seen. It is, however,
significant that the Court did not base its holding on this ground but
on the fundamental difference between a stock dividend and a cash
dividend.
BEN

H.

DICKENS

The following case comments, written by freshmen students in
fulfillment of a portion of the requirements in the course known as
Introduction to Legal Research and Writing, are considered of sufficient quality to merit publication.

CRIMINAL LAW: COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE TO GRAND
JURY AS BAR TO PROSECUTION
State ex rel. Marcus v. Pearson, 68 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1953)
Pursuant to subpoena relator testified and produced his personal
records before a grand jury investigating gambling. He was subsequently informed against for conspiracy to violate the Florida gambling laws. In a suggestion for writ of prohibition filed in the Supreme
Court he sought to prohibit trial, contending that, since he was
compelled to testify before the grand jury concerning gambling, he
was immunized from prosecution for gambling "in any form."'1 HELD,
there is no presumption that matter disclosed to the grand jury by
relator was used as a basis for the information filed against him, and
he failed to allege the connection requisite to bar of prosecution.
Proceeding dismissed.
'FLA. STAT. §932.29 (1953): "No person shall be excused from attending and
testifying . . . for a violation of any of the statutes of this state against bribery,
burglary, larceny, gaming or gambling, or of any of the statutes against the illegal
sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, upon the ground or for the reason that
the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend
to convict him of a crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, but no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall
be received against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding."
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In so far as constitutional immunity from compulsory self-incrimination is concerned, compulsory testimony before a grand jury is
entitled to protection equal to that accorded compulsory testimony
given before a court.2 An investigation by a federal grand jury is a
"criminal case," as used in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, when the investigation is of "criminal matter."3 In the
absence of a statute permitting prosecutors to compel witnesses to
testify in criminal proceedings, no person may be compelled to testify
against himself. 4 A statute compelling such testimony must afford
absolute protection against further prosecution for the particular
offense or transaction to which the question relates.5 Unless the
statutory protection of a witness is at least as broad as the constitutional protection against self-incrimination, the statute is invalid.6
A witness, however, is not granted immunity for voluntary disclosures before a grand jury; compulsion is a prerequisite to statutory
immunity.'
Most states have statutes similar to the Florida statute empowering
prosecutors to compel witnesses to testify, and these statutes contain
similar immunity provisions.8 The statutes are generally applicable
only to compel testimony as to certain specified crimes. In most
jurisdictions the courts have stated that the accused, to be successful
in his attempt to bar prosecution, must show that the accusatorial
writ is based upon the specific transaction, matter, or thing about
which he gave information.9 In federal cases the question is whether
the testimony will probably form a link in a chain of evidence tend2E.g., United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943); State ex rel. Hemnings v.
Coleman, 137 Fla. 80, 187 So. 793 (1939); Frain v. Applegate, 289 Ky. 605, 40
S.V.2d 274 (1931).
3Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
4U.S. CONsT. Amend. V; FLA. CoNsr. Dled. of Rights §12.
5Brown v. Walker, 70 Fed. 46 (W.D. Pa. 1895), afi'd, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
6E.g., United States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424 (Di. Conn. 1928); Koonck v.

Cooney, 55 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1952); People v. Reiss, 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N.Y.S.2d
209 (1st Dep't 1938).
7United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942); Ex parte Montgomery,

244 Ala. 91, 12 So.2d 314 (1943); People v. Curtis, 36 Cal. App.2d 306, 98 P.2d 228
(1939); State ex rel. Raines v. Grayson, 55 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1951).
SE.g., ARiz. CODE ANN. §43-2715 (Supp. 1953); Ky. REv. STAT. §436.510 (1953);
N.Y. PrNAL LAW §§381, 584, 996; ORE. RYEV.
STAT. §167.520 (1953).
9E.g., People v. Willson, 205 Mich. 28, 171 N.W. 474 (1919); Triplett v. State,
136 Miss. 320, 101 So. 501 (1924); State v. Hennessey, 195 Ore. 355, 245 P.2d 875
(1952); Fine v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. Rep. 652, 18 S.W.2d 156 (1929); People v.
Hayes, 28 Misc. 93, 59 N.Y. Supp. 761 (Sup. Ct. 1899); cf. State v. Chitwood, 73
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ing to establish in a subsequent prosecution the guilt of the person
testifying.O
Some jurisdictions limit immunity to those offenses enumerated in
the statute." Others construe it broadly enough to embrace testimony that might lead to any criminal prosecution; the immunity extends not only to the particular cause under consideration at the
time of questioning but to all others which may be based upon or
developed from such testimony or evidence. 12 At least one jurisdiction 3 does not grant immunity if the data used in the trial of defendant are obtained from a source other than the defendant's own
prior testimony, even though he testified at an earlier inquiry. It
should be noted, however, that the defendant was not shown to have
made incriminating statements at the earlier inquiry. Minnesota
has held that immunity is not granted, even for testimony compulsorily given by a defendant before a grand jury, when the grand
jury investigation concerned criminal acts of another and when the
14
facts of defendant's crime may be proved without his testimony.
New York holds that if a person refuses to waive his statutory immunity prior to appearing and testifying before the grand jury he
may not subsequently be prosecuted for offenses disclosed by his
testimony. 5
Florida, on the ground of public policy, has extended immunity
from prosecution to those compelled to testify concerning selfincriminating facts in criminal proceedings before a grand jury, 6
the purpose being to expedite detection and punishment of offenders
against the criminal law.Y The immunity is not granted to one who
testifies voluntarily before a grand jury after the prosecuting attorney
advises him that his testimony may be used against him'8 but only
Ariz. 314, 240 P.2d 1202 (1952).
10United States v. Heike, 175 Fed. 852 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
"State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1948); Elliott v. State,
19 S.W. 249 (Tex. 1892); ef. People v. Reggel, 8 Utah 21, 28 Pac. 955 (1892);
Flanary v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 775, 75 S.E. 289 (1912).
12Koonck v. Cooney, 55 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1952); cf. Ex parte Williams, 127 Cal.
App. 424, 16 P.2d 172 (1932).
"3People v. Willson, 205 Mich. 28, 171 N.W. 474 (1919). Contra: Flanary v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 775, 75 S.E. 289 (1912).
1aCity of Mankato v. Olger, 126 Minn. 521, 148 N.W. 471 (1914).
151n re Solovei, 276 N.Y. 647, 12 N.E.2d 802 (1938).
,eRichards
v. State, 144 Fla. 177, 197 So. 772 (1940).
17E.g., Ingram v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320, 149 So. 369 (1933).
18E.g., State ex rel. Hemmings v. Coleman, 137 Fla. 80, 187 So. 793 (1939).
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